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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature 0f the Case
This

is

an unemployment benefits

(“Hiatt”) appeals

that she

case.

Claimant-Appellant Siranoush Hiatt

from a finding 0f the Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”)

was discharged

for

workplace misconduct by her employer, Health Care

Idaho Credit Union (“HCICU”), and thus ineligible for benefits under the Idaho

Employment Security Law, Idaho Code

B.

§§ 72-1301 et seq.

Course 0f the Proceedings
Hiatt applied for unemployment benefits after she separated from her

employment with

On August

HCICU
5,

2018,

0n February 22, 2018. Exhibit,

IDOL

p.6.1

denied Hiatt’s request for benefits 0n the basis that

she had been discharged for misconduct. Exhibit, p.45. Hiatt timely appealed t0 the

Appeals Bureau 0f IDOL. Exhibit, pp.52-53.

A telephonic hearing 0n the
11.19-20. In a written decision

appeal was held 0n September 25, 2018.

dated September 28, 2018, the Appeals Examiner also

concluded that Hiatt was discharged for employment-related misconduct.

oprpeals Examiner,

R.,

Decision

p.4.2

Hiatt timely appealed t0 the Commission on October

1

T12, p.4,

“Exhibit” refers t0 the written record before the

9,

2018. R., Claimant’s

IDOL Appeals Examiner, Which was

included in

the record before the Commission.
2 “R.”
refers t0 the Agency Record prepared by the Commission for the instant appeal. Unfortunately,
the pages are not numbered. Throughout this brief, reference Will be made to the name of the
pleading 0r order in the Agency Record, with a citation t0 the relevant page or pages within that

document.

Notice 0f Appeal; Notice 0f Appearance; Request for Written Transcript;

and Request

for Written Brief.

The Department

filed its Notice 0f Appearance

0n October 22, 2018.

R.,

Notice

0f Appearance.

Hiatt filed a written brief in support of her appeal. R., Appellant’s Brief.
Thereafter, the

2018, entered

Commission conducted its de novo review and 0n November

its decision. R.,

Decision

and Order. The Commission

the record created before the Appeals Examiner, that Hiatt

unemployment

benefits because she

was discharged

for

27,

found, based 0n

was not

eligible for

workplace misconduct.

Id.,

p.8.

On January
R.,

7,

Supreme Court.

2019, Hiatt filed a notice of appeal to the Idaho

Notice oprpeal.

C.

Statement of the Facts

HCICU hired Hiatt 0n June 25,
loan

officer. Tr., p.8, 11.21-24.

2016, TL, p.8, 11.14-16, as a full-time mortgage

HCICU had seven employees at the time and Hiatt was

paid significantly more than other employees, even more than HCICU’S CEO, Fallon
Eisenbarth,
11.15-17.

Who had been working there

Hiatt’s

for 14 years. Tr., p.12, 1.25

compensation included a base

commissions 0n loans. After working at

salary

-

p.13, 1.20; p.16,

and various rates

HCICU for a short time,

0f

Hiatt requested that

a mortgage loan processor be hired t0 assist her and that request was granted.

Tr.,

compensation increased multiple times during her

first

p.50, 11.15-20. Hiatt’s total

year working at HCICU, including a commission increase in February of 2017. Tr.,
p.13, ll.9-13; p.47, ll.8-11; p.49. ll.9-10; p.55, ll.14-18.
In April 2017, Hiatt hit her head when she fell at work and suffered a mild
traumatic brain injury. Tr., p.14, l.21 – p.15, l.9. By all accounts, at first Eisenbarth
and HCICU were very compassionate about Hiatt’s situation and accommodated her
disability. Tr., p.16, ll.5-14; p.38, ll.7-11.
According to Hiatt, after a period of time Eisenbarth became frustrated
because Hiatt was unable to return to full-time status and complained about having
to pay vacation pay, 401k benefits, sick leave, and other benefits for Hiatt. Tr., p.39,
ll.2-6.
In August of 2017, Hiatt’s pay was decreased for the first time. Tr., p.39, ll.911. Both her hourly wage and commission rates were reduced, and her monthly
commissions were capped. Tr., p.49, ll.14-20.
Later, Eisenbarth met with her board of directors to review the upcoming
annual budget and the decision was made to again reduce Hiatt’s pay because HCICU
had lost money during the prior year, which was the first time that had happened
since Eisenbarth took over as CEO in 2014. Tr., p.9, ll.7-10; p.16, l.21 – p.17, l.3; p.53,
l.15 – p.54, l.2.
In early February 2018, Eisenbarth told Hiatt that she would have to start
using her sick leave and vacation pay for the time she was off of work for disability
and worker’s compensation. Tr., p.39, ll.18-24. (Since April 2017, Hiatt had been
receiving worker’s compensation and was working on a three-quarters of the time
3

basis. Tr., p.15, ll.10-13.) In or about the second week of February 2018, Hiatt was
told that she was going to receive a second pay decrease. Tr., p.40, l.25 – p.41, l.3.
Hiatt proposed a flat salary of $100,000 per year. Tr., p.12, l.17; p.53, ll.5-6. The year
before, Hiatt had made $156,000 in salary and commissions. Tr., p.12, ll.10-12.
HCICU offered Hiatt an annual flat salary of $72,000. Tr., p.53, ll.7-8.
Eisenbarth explained what happened next during a meeting with Hiatt held on
February 21, 2018, to discuss Hiatt’s reduction in pay. When Hiatt was called into
Eisenbarth’s office to discuss the proposed pay cut, “she just became very hostile and
started yelling at me and I couldn’t get anywhere with her.” Tr., p.9, ll.14-15. Hiatt
was very upset and Eisenbarth told her to work the rest of the day from home and
return the next day at 10:00 a.m. with any questions she had regarding the salary
change “so that we could stay on track.” Tr., p.9, ll.16-19. Eisenbarth testified that
Hiatt was told to go home that day “due to her unprofessional behavior towards me,”
not because Hiatt had asked to talk with the board of directors about her decrease in
pay and Eisenbarth’s treatment of her. Tr., p.50, l.24 – p.51, l.4.
An hour after being sent home, Hiatt received a written warning letter by
email, Tr., p.42, l.23 – p.43, l.1, which read:
2/21/2018
To: Sira Hiatt
Mortgage Loan Officer
From: Fallon Eisenbarth
CEO
Subject: Written Warning-Insubordination
4

This letter serves as a formal written reprimand for your unprofessional
conduct. I asked you to leave today because you engaged in
insubordinate conduct by raising your voice. This behavior will not be
tolerated.
It’s best if you work from home the rest of the day and document your
hours worked. I would like to discuss questions you may have tomorrow
at 10:00. I would like you to write your questions down so we can stay
on track.
/s/
Fallon Eisenbarth
Exhibit, p.9.
The next day, February 22, 2018, Hiatt arrived at 10:00 a.m. and met with
Eisenbarth and Arminda Kindrick, HCICU’s operations supervisor. Tr., p.28, l.21 –
p.29, l.1. Hiatt was asked if she had brought any questions and said she had not. Tr.,
p.9, ll.20-23.

Eisenbarth summarized what happened after that, before later

testifying in more detail:
And I started to discuss the changes that were going to take place and
she did the exact same thing she did the day before and just freaked out.
I couldn’t get a word in. So, at that time I just decided to terminate her,
because this was, you know, the third time she’s done that to me and I’m
not going to tolerate that kind of behavior in the office. It was really
unprofessional.
Tr., p.9, l.23 – p.10, l.5.
Eisenbarth testified that Hiatt wanted to know why her salary was being
changed because she had performed very well the year before. Eisenbarth could not
get a word in. Tr., p.10, ll.10-15. “She was yelling saying I’m a liar.” Tr., p.10, l.16.
“I’m not fair. Why didn’t I cut everyone else’s salary.” Tr., p.10, ll.16-17. “[S]he just
5

was screaming
wanted t0 talk
22.

“A

lot of

at

me

t0 the

about miscellaneous things.”

board and she was going to get Eisenbarth

nonsense. Nothing professional.”

Tr., p.10, 1.22. It

[Eisenbarth] the entire time

random

things.” TL, p.10, 1.23

terminated Hiatt “during her screaming and freaking out.”

was

“just shocked”

by Hiatt’s unprofessional

was

behavior 0n the

actions.

—

“hostile

“just

p.11,

and out

0f

screaming at
Eisenbarth

1.3.

T12, p.11, 11.11-13.

Tr., p.53, 11.10-12.

She

In closing,

was terminated was because

0f her

let and 22nd and she had already been warned prior t0 — 9/27

about,

Eisenbarth stated “the Whole reason

you know

fired. Tr., p.10, 11.20-

was very mad about her salary change and

control.” Hiatt

Hiatt said she

Tr., p.10, 1.18.

(unintelligible)

it’s

in her

Why

file,

[Hiatt]

so

I

—

it

was kind

0f the final straw.”

Tr.,

p.58, 11.14-18.3

Hiatt painted an entirely different picture. She testified that Eisenbarth

shouted at her t0 g0 home during the February
g0 home. Fine.

You can talk to the board. Go home.”

thought Eisenbarth “was just like
office in tears

2131:

and about an hour

meeting and

Tr., p.41, 11.19-22.

mad and kidding.”
later received

said, “I

Which said there would be a meeting at 10:00 a.m. the next day.

t0

Hiatt said she

Tr., p.42, 11.11-12.

an insubordination

want you

Hiatt

letter

left

the

by email

Tr., p.42, 1.23

— p.43,

1.1.

Hiatt admitted she was upset at the meeting on February 22nd, but “was not

The record before the Appeals Examiner and the Commission includes handwritten notes,
apparently taken from Hiatt’s personnel file, that include the following notation: “9/27/17 Sira
screamed in my office during salary discussion. Let her know this is not tolerated. Verbal warning.”

3

Exhibit, p.12.

6

yelling in any way, shape or form. I was talking just like I’m talking right now [during
her testimony] and I had – I had expressed my concern that I was being targeted
because of my disability.”

Tr., p.44, ll.13-18. Later in her testimony, Hiatt

acknowledged that “[t]he conversation got a little heated, because [Eisenbarth] was
getting frustrated because of me questioning why is my pay being cut and nobody
else’s is being cut.” Tr., p.45, ll.7-9.
Arminda Kindrick was present during the February 22, 2018, meeting. In
contrast to Hiatt’s somewhat mild description, she testified it was “a pretty difficult
meeting” and was “more accusations and supposition.” Tr., p.24, ll.3-4. Kindrick
stated there “wasn’t really much discussion as far as anything noteworthy that would
actually lead anywhere to any kind of compromise or – it was, basically, just off topic.”
Tr., p.24, ll.9-12. Kindrick repeated that “it was just basically accusations,” that Hiatt
was “pretty combative” and “upset and accusatory,” Tr., p.24, l.16 – p.25, l.4, and that
Hiatt “[d]idn’t really want to listen to anything anybody had to say.” Tr., p.25, ll.4-5.
She added that “when it became more volatile . . . [Hiatt] said when the board heard
exactly things that were going on that it would be [Eisenbarth’s] job on the line.” Tr.,
p.25, ll.5-9.

According to Kindrick, Hiatt also said she believed the salary

adjustments were because of her disability and that she was being retaliated against
because of her disability. Tr., p.26, ll.10-12; p.28, l.21 – p.29, l.1.
Kindrick believed Hiatt was terminated for her volatile behavior, not because
of her disability, explaining:
The meeting was supposed to be a discussion regarding [Hiatt’s]
7

questions about the pay structures and there were no questions, it was
just accusations and quite volatile at that point . . . it was just straight
out insubordination. I mean it was unprofessional and there was,
basically, no recovery of the relationship there.
Tr., p.26, l.15 – p.27, l.3.
Christy Ford, a teller at HCICU, said that when Hiatt left on February 22nd,
she seemed upset and said something like “Good luck keeping your jobs here.” Tr.,
p.36, ll.5-11.
As discussed below in the argument section of this brief, the Commission found
that Eisenbarth’s testimony was more credible than Hiatt’s testimony. It concluded
that Hiatt was not eligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged
for workplace misconduct.

8

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Does substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence support
the Commission’s finding that Hiatt was discharged for employee
misconduct under the Employment Security Law?

9

ARGUMENT
I.

The Commission’s Finding That Hiatt Was Discharged for Emplovee Misconduct
Is Supported BV Substantial and Competent Evidence

Standards 0f Review

A.

When
Supreme

considering an appeal from the Industrial Commission, the Idaho

Court’s review

0f Labor,

is

limited to questions of law. Harper

V.

Idaho Department

161 Idaho 114, 116, 384 P.3d 361, 363 (2016). Indeed, the Court

is

“constitutionally compelled t0 defer t0 the Industrial Commission’s findings of fact

Where supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Locker
151 Idaho 696, 699, 263 P.3d 750 753 (2011), quoting Teffer

M,

102 Idaho 439, 439, 631 P.2d 610, 610 (1981). See

V.

V.

Twin

also,

How

Soel, Inc.,

Falls School Dist.

Idaho C0nst., Art. V,

§ 9.

In conducting

View

all

its

deferential review 0f

findings, this Court will

the facts and inferences in the light most favorable t0 the party

before the Commission. Ehrlich
83,

Commission

438 P.3d at 777, 780 (2019),

339 P.3d 1148, 1150-51 (2014).
conclusions from the facts,

it

V.

DelRaV Maugham, M.D.,

citing, Bell V.

Even

if

P.L.L.C., 165 Idaho 80,

Dep't 0f Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 746-47,

the Court might have reached different

Will not overturn the

Commission’s findings

by substantial and competent evidence. Ehrlich, 165 Idaho at
Christv

V.

evidence

is

who prevailed

83,

if

supported

438 P.3d at 780;

Grasmick Produce, 162 Idaho 199, 201, 395 P.3d 819, 821. “Substantial

more than a

scintilla 0f proof,

but less than a preponderance.

10

It is

relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Ehrlich, 165

Idaho at 83, 438 P.3d at 780, quoting, Christy, 162 Idaho at 201-02, 395 P.3d at 82122.

B.

Legal Framework for Review 0f Emplovee Misconduct Cases
Personal

eligibility conditions for

unemployment

benefits include, inter alia,

the requirement that, in cases of termination, a claimant’s termination

misconduct in connection With his employment.”
claimant generally has the burden 0f establishing

I.C.

§

eligibility, in

circumstances where
0f demonstrating the

discharge was for conduct that constituted misconduct under the
Security Law.

Copper

394, 397 (2016), citing,

V.

Ace Hardware/Sannan,

Inc.,

“for

72-1366(5). Although a

was terminated, the employer has the burden

the claimant

was not

Employment

159 Idaho 638, 641, 365 P.3d

IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01.

There are three, sometimes overlapping, categories 0f disqualifying employee
misconduct:
a.

Disregard of Employer's Interest.

A willful, intentional

disregard 0f the employer's interest.
b.

Violation of Reasonable Rules.

A deliberate Violation of

the employer's reasonable rules.

Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged
c.
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard 0f behavior which the
employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no requirement
that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional, 0r deliberate. The
claimant's subjective state 0f mind is irrelevant. The test for misconduct
in “standard of behavior cases“ is as follows:

Whether the claimant's conduct
standard 0f behavior expected by the employer; and
i.

11

fell

below the

ii.
Whether the employer's expectation was objectively
reasonable in the particular case.

IDAPA

09.01.30.275.02,

and Cooper, supra. These

quoted in Harper, supra,

categories 0f misconduct are consistent With well-established Idaho case law. Jenkins
V.

Agri—Lines

Com,

&

11 Idaho 549, 602 P.2d 47 (1979); Johns V. S. H. Kress

Co.,

78

Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957).

The

parties do not dispute that Hiatt

voluntarily quit. Consequently,

discharge

was

for

was discharged, as opposed

t0

having

HCICU had the burden 0f demonstrating that Hiatt’s

misconduct

in

with

connection

IDAPA

employment.

09.01.30.275.02.c.

Under the “standards

0f behavior” analysis, the

preponderance 0f the evidence that

(1)

employer had a right

0f behavior the

employer must show by a

the employee’s conduct

t0 expect;

and

(2)

below a standard

the employer’s expectations

were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Folks
No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 837, 933 P.2d 642, 646 (1997).

fell

V.

Moscow School District

As a general

rule, it

need not

be shown that an employee's disregard 0f a standard 0f behavior was
intentional, 0r deliberate.

Adams

V.

Aspen Water,

is

objectively reasonable

Inc.,

150 Idaho 408, 413, 247 P.3d

635, 640 (2011).

An

expectation

the employee, 0r

if it

"ﬂows naturally" from the employment relationship.

C.

willful,

if it

was communicated

to

Id.

Substantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Finding that Hiatt Was
Discharged for Emplovee Misconduct Under the “Standards 0f Behavior”

Prong

of

Misconduct Analvsis

The Commission conducted a de novo review

12

0f the record

and found the

evidence insufficient t0 show misconduct based upon a Violation 0f the employer’s

reasonable rules.
did,

See

IDAPA

09.01.30.275.02.b. R., Decision

and

Order, pp.5-6. It

however, find misconduct based upon Hiatt’s disregard 0f “standards 0f behavior”

reasonably expected by

HCICU.

It

weighed the conﬂicting evidence, and, quite

obviously, found Hiatt’s testimony t0 be less credible:

was combative during either meeting
with Eisenbarth. Claimant explained that she thought Eisenbarth was
“joking” When she told Claimant t0 go home 0n February 21, 2018, and
was shocked When she received the reprimand by email later that day.
Claimant

Claimant points

[Hiatt] denies she

statements Kindrick provided as evidence
supporting Claimant’s contention that she did not raise her voice 0r
threaten Eisenbarth because Kindrick did not mention such behavior.
However, both 0f Kindrick’s statements describe Claimant’s behavior
during the meeting on February 22, 2018 as deteriorating and
accusatory.

.

.

to written

.

A preponderance 0f the totalitV of the competent evidence in this
was upset and combative during both
her
own
admission
Claimant suspected that Eisenbarth
By
was plotting against her for months and these feeling likely boiled over
When she met With Eisenbarth about her salary. Claimant made
accusatorv and threatening statements. In all likelihood, thev were
delivered in a hostile rather than conversational tone.
record establishes that Claimant

meetings.

Claimant’s annovance over her compensation is understandable,
but her frustration did not entitle her to unprofessional behavior
towards her supervisor. After Claimant’s behavior 0n Februarv 21,
2018, Eisenbarth warned Claimant that her behavior was unacceptable
and would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, Claimant did not heed the

warning When she returned 0n Februarv

22,

2018 and that behavior

resulted in her discharge.
R.,

Decision

The
misconduct.

and Order,

pp.7-8 (emphasis added; citations to record omitted).

Commission found Hiatt was
Id., p.8.

In doing

so, it

discharged

for

employment-related

understood the applicable law, reciting that

misconduct under the “standards of behavior” category requires a showing that
13

employer’s expectations were either communicated to the claimant or “flowed
naturally” from the employment relationship. R., Decision and Order, p.5. The
Commission’s finding that Hiatt did not heed HCICU’s warning “that her behavior
was unacceptable and would not be tolerated,” was a finding that HCICU had
communicated its expectations to Hiatt.
This finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence. As noted
above, on February 21, 2018, Eisenbarth send Hiatt a letter by email, with the subject
line: “Written Warning-Insubordination.” R., Decision and Order, p.9. This letter
stated it was “a formal written reprimand” and placed Hiatt on notice that
“unprofessional conduct,” “insubordinate conduct,” and “raising your voice” “will not
be tolerated.” Id. Hiatt confirmed in her testimony that she received this letter. Tr.,
p.42, l.23 – p.43, l.1. There also was evidence that some five months earlier Hiatt was
reprimanded for similar conduct and received a similar warning. Tr., p.58, ll.14-18.
This oral warning was documented in Hiatt’s personnel file: “9/27/17 Sira screamed
in my office during salary discussion. Let her know this is not tolerated. Verbal
warning.” R., Decision and Order, p.12.
HCICU’s expectations were objectively reasonable because they were
communicated to Hiatt. They also were objectively reasonable because it “naturally
flows” both from this particular employment relationship and from most other
employment relationships in general, that a CEO, the supervisory head of a business,
may not be yelled at, threatened, and subjected to unprofessional conduct by a
subordinate employee. The Commission’s findings that Hiatt engaged in this type of
14

conduct,

and was terminated

evidence.

for doing so, is

supported by substantial and competent

The Commission observed that Kindrick described the February

22, 2018,

meeting as deteriorating and accusatory, that Hiatt was “upset and combative,” and
that Hiatt

made accusatory and threatening statements

that “[i]n

all likelihood

delivered in a hostile rather than conversational tone.” R., Decision

The Commission stated that

is

and Order,

p.7.

Hiatt’s frustration “did not entitle her t0 unprofessional

behavior towards her supervisor.”
“Insubordination”

were

Id.

a form 0f misconduct that violates the “standards 0f

behavior” prong. Harper, 161 Idaho at 114, 384 P.3d at 754; Locker, 151 Idaho at 700,

263 P.3d at 754. This word merely describes misconduct that
supervisor;

it

is

directed at a

does not define an entirely separate category of misconduct. Here,

Hiatt’s conduct was, in addition t0 being insubordinate, “unprofessional,” “hostile,”

“threatening,”

and “combative.” Although perhaps an argument can be made that

insubordination

cannot be said that

all

all

insubordination

is hostile,

Essentially, Hiatt’s conduct

was beyond the

pale.

The

descriptive words chosen by Eisenbarth in her testimony were “out 0f control”

and

is

unprofessional,

threatening, and combative.

it

“freaking out.” Tr., p.11, 1.1-13.

In

Muchow V.

(2014), this Court

Varsitv Contractors,

Inc.,

156 Idaho 457, 461, 328 P.3d 437, 441

upheld a finding by the Commission that an insubordinate

employee engaged in misconduct When she shredded documents contrary

to the order

0f her superior:

In this case, the commission found that by disobeying the director's
15

order not t0 shred the documents, the claimant disregarded a standard
0f behavior that the employer has a right to expect 0f an employee. “If
the alleged misconduct involves a disregard 0f a standard of behavior

Which the employer has a right t0 expect 0f his employees, there is no
requirement that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional, 0r
deliberate. The claimant's subjective state 0f mind is irrelevant.” IDAPA
09.01.30.275.02.c.

Muchow, 156 Idaho
0n February

at 461, 328 P.3d at 441.

21, 2018,

was an order

The insubordination letter Hiatt received

0r directive from Eisenbarth. Hiatt

was

told a

recurrence 0f her unprofessional and insubordinate conduct would not be tolerated.

When
t0

Hiatt violated that order 0r directive in less than a day, Eisenbarth was true

her word.
Hiatt’s conduct constituted workplace misconduct

under the standards 0f

behavior prong of analysis. Although there are some instances where an employee’s
expression

0f

misconduct,

disagreement or discontent

e.g.,

m,

may

not

amount

129 Idaho at 838, 933 P.2d at 647, this

t0

is

insubordinate

not such a case

because of the temporal proximity and clarity of the warning given t0 Hiatt and the

magnitude

0f her breach of that warning. Clearly, the

Commission did not find Hiatt’s

conduct t0 be reasonable under the circumstances.
Hiatt attempts to excuse her behavior by arguing that Eisenbarth terminated
her, not for her misconduct, but because she
t0 advise the

was

disabled, 0r because she

was going

board of directors 0f Eisenbarth’s alleged maltreatment of her. There

was conﬂicting evidence 0n

this point. Contrasting Hiatt’s suppositions

were the

testimony 0f both Eisenbarth and Kindrick that Hiatt was terminated for her
behavior 0n February 22, 2018.

When Kindrick was
16

asked

if

Hiatt’s termination

had

anything to do With her

disability,

she answered “Absolutely not.”

T12, p.22, 11.8-11.

Eisenbarth stated that Hiatt’s disability had nothing t0 do With anything,

and that Hiatt was terminated

11.15-15,

—

p.10,

1.5.

for

her unprofessional conduct.

T12, p.18,

Tr., p.9, 1.23

Eisenbarth added that there was nothing inappropriate about Hiatt’s

request t0 speak to the board of directors and that Hiatt could do so “in a professional

manner.”

Tr., p.18, 1.18

Although Hiatt

—

p.19,

testified that she

t0 the board, Tr., p.38, 11.7-11,

“[S]he wasn’t kicked out of

the board, she

me.”

1.6.

—

p.51,

my

1.4.

t0 talk

Eisenbarth was adamant that this was not the reason:
office

was kicked out 0f the

Tr., p.50, 1.24

was discharged because she wanted

0n the 20 — 21st because she wanted

office

due

to

t0 talk t0

her unprofessional behavior towards

In the end, the Commission measured the conﬂicting

evidence and entered findings 0f fact consistent with the testimony 0f HCICU’S
witnesses. It did not find that Hiatt

was discharged because

0f her disability 0r in

retaliation for her request t0 speak With the board.

Even
framework

if

this

Court were to g0 down the path of analyzing the facts Within the

of a discrimination claim,

Which would be inappropriate

for a

number

of

reasons including for the reason that the Commission’s findings of fact d0 not support

such a claim, NCICU’S nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Hiatt were not

shown

t0

Ebersole
sit

be a pretext and, as the Eighth Circuit Court 0f Appeals explained in
V.

Novo Nordisk,

1110.,

758 F.3d 917, 927 (8th

as “a super-personnel department”

Cir. 2014), courts

and second-guess business

In one of our most 0ft-quoted passages,
17

we

should not

decisions:

said in 1994 that “[fjederal

courts d0 not

sit

as a super-personnel department that reexamines an

entity's business decisions.”

One reason we emphasize

this point is that

a number 0f plaintiffs present a sympathetic situation in Which the
employer's judgment in imposing discipline may appear poor 01"
erroneous t0 outsiders. It is tempting to think that the role 0f the federal
courts is t0 offer a remedy in that sort 0f case. Whether we might believe
that [the employer] was unduly harsh in its treatment of [the plaintiff],
however, is not a matter t0 be considered in deciding this appeal. Our
authority is t0 determine only Whether there is a genuine issue for trial
on the question Whether [the employer] discharged [the employee]
because of his race.
Ebersol, 758 F.3d at 927 (citations omitted).

The Court

in Ebersol added:

Thus, Whether a prudent employer would have treated Ebersole's
actions more leniently because 0f Reichard's authorization is not our
call. Ebersole has not produced sufficient probative evidence that her
termination was the result 0f unlawful FMLA retaliation.
Id.

It

t0 the

was

for the

Commission

testimony admitted.

It

to

determine the credibility and weight t0 be given

found Hiatt’s suppositions about the reasons

for

her

discharge unsupported by the evidence. Even though conﬂicting evidence was

presented to the Commission, the deference to be accorded t0 the Commission’s
factual findings

is

not thereby diminished. T0 the contrary, in cases such as these,

faithful application of this Court’s deferential standard 0f review

necessary and important.

18

becomes even more

CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the factual findings of the
Commission. It is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the Commission’s
findings and decision that Hiatt was terminated for misconduct in connection with
employment and, thus, was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Doug Werth
DOUG WERTH
Lead Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Labor
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